Berkshire Letter1978-02-018 min read

Steady Progress - 1978

1978 was a year of solid progress. GEICO's turnaround continued to contribute to earnings while investment portfolio performed well.

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Accounting Preamble

First, a few words about accounting. The merger with Diversified Retailing Company, Inc. at yearend adds two new complications in the presentation of our financial results. After the merger, our ownership of Blue Chip Stamps increased to approximately 58% and, therefore, the accounts of that company must be fully consolidated in the Balance Sheet and Statement of Earnings presentation of Berkshire. In previous reports, our share of the net earnings only of Blue Chip had been included as a single item on Berkshire's Statement of Earnings, and there had been a similar one-line inclusion on our Balance Sheet of our share of their net assets.

This full consolidation of sales, expenses, receivables, inventories, debt, etc. produces an aggregation of figures from many diverse businesses - textiles, insurance, candy, newspapers, trading stamps - with dramatically different economic characteristics. In some of these your ownership is 100% but, in those businesses which are owned by Blue Chip but fully consolidated, your ownership as a Berkshire shareholder is only 58%. (Ownership by others of the balance of these businesses is accounted for by the large minority interest item on the liability side of the Balance Sheet.) Such a grouping of Balance Sheet and Earnings items - some wholly owned, some partly owned - tends to obscure economic reality more than illuminate it. In fact, it represents a form of presentation that we never prepare for internal use during the year and which is of no value to us in any management activities.

For that reason, throughout the report we provide much separate financial information and commentary on the various segments of the business to help you evaluate Berkshire's performance and prospects. Much of this segmented information is mandated by SEC disclosure rules and covered in "Management's Discussion" on pages 29 to 34. And in this letter we try to present to you a view of our various operating entities from the same perspective that we view them managerially.

A second complication arising from the merger is that the 1977 figures shown in this report are different from the 1977 figures shown in the report we mailed to you last year. Accounting convention requires that when two entities such as Diversified and Berkshire are merged, all financial data subsequently must be presented as if the companies had been merged at the time they were formed rather than just recently. So the enclosed financial statements, in effect, pretend that in 1977 (and earlier years) the Diversified-Berkshire merger already had taken place, even though the actual merger date was December 30, 1978. This shifting base makes comparative commentary confusing and, from time to time in our narrative report, we will talk of figures and performance for Berkshire shareholders as historically reported to you rather than as restated after the Diversified merger.

With that preamble it can be stated that, with or without restated figures, 1978 was a good year. Operating earnings, exclusive of capital gains, at 19.4% of beginning shareholders' investment were within a fraction of our 1972 record. While we believe it is improper to include capital gains or losses in evaluating the performance of a single year, they are an important component of the longer term record. Because of such gains, Berkshire's long-term growth in equity per share has been greater than would be indicated by compounding the returns from operating earnings that we have reported annually.

For example, over the last three years - generally a bonanza period for the insurance industry, our largest profit producer - Berkshire's per share net worth virtually has doubled, thereby compounding at about 25% annually through a combination of good operating earnings and fairly substantial capital gains. Neither this 25% equity gain from all sources nor the 19.4% equity gain from operating earnings in 1978 is sustainable. The insurance cycle has turned downward in 1979, and it is almost certain that operating earnings measured by return on equity will fall this year. However, operating earnings measured in dollars are likely to increase on the much larger shareholders' equity now employed in the business.

In contrast to this cautious view about near term return from operations, we are optimistic about prospects for long term return from major equity investments held by our insurance companies. We make no attempt to predict how security markets will behave; successfully forecasting short term stock price movements is something we think neither we nor anyone else can do. In the longer run, however, we feel that many of our major equity holdings are going to be worth considerably more money than we paid, and that investment gains will add significantly to the operating returns of the insurance group.

Sources of Earnings

To give you a better picture of just where Berkshire's earnings are produced, we show below a table which requires a little explanation. Berkshire owns close to 58% of Blue Chip which, in addition to 100% ownership of several businesses, owns 80% of Wesco Financial Corporation. Thus, Berkshire's equity in Wesco's earnings is about 46%. In aggregate, businesses that we control have about 7,000 full-time employees and generate revenues of over $500 million.

The table shows the overall earnings of each major operating category on a pre-tax basis (several of the businesses have low tax rates because of significant amounts of tax-exempt interest and dividend income), as well as the share of those earnings belonging to Berkshire both on a pre-tax and after-tax basis. Significant capital gains or losses attributable to any of the businesses are not shown in the operating earnings figure, but are aggregated on the "Realized Securities Gain" line at the bottom of the table. Because of various accounting and tax intricacies, the figures in the table should not be treated as holy writ, but rather viewed as close approximations of the 1977 and 1978 earnings contributions of our constituent businesses.

(in thousands of dollars)1978 Total Earnings Before Income Taxes1977 Total Earnings Before Income Taxes1978 Berkshire Share of Earnings Before Income Taxes1977 Berkshire Share of Earnings Before Income Taxes1978 Berkshire Share Net Earnings After Tax1977 Berkshire Share Net Earnings After Tax
Total - all entities$66,180$57,089$54,350$42,234$39,242$30,393
Earnings from operations:
Insurance Group: Underwriting$3,001$5,802$3,000$5,802$1,560$3,017
Insurance Group: Net investment income19,70512,80419,69112,80416,40011,360
Berkshire-Waumbec textiles2,916(620)2,916(620)1,342(322)
Associated Retail Stores, Inc.2,7572,7752,7572,7751,1761,429
See's Candies12,48212,8407,0136,5983,0492,974
Buffalo Evening News(2,913)751(1,637)389(738)158
Blue Chip Stamps - Parent2,1331,0911,1985661,382892
Illinois National Bank and Trust Company4,8223,8004,7103,7064,2623,288
Wesco Financial Corporation - Parent1,7712,006777813665419
Mutual Savings and Loan Association10,5566,7794,6382,7473,0421,946
Interest on Debt(5,566)(5,302)(4,546)(4,255)(2,349)(2,129)
Other72016543810226148
Total Earnings from Operations$52,384$42,891$40,955$31,427$30,052$23,080
Realized Securities Gain13,79614,19813,39510,8079,1907,313
Total Earnings$66,180$57,089$54,350$42,234$39,242$30,393

Blue Chip and Wesco are public companies with reporting requirements of their own. Later in this report we are reproducing the narrative reports of the principal executives of both companies, describing their 1978 operations. Some of the figures they utilize will not match to the penny the ones we use in this report, again because of accounting and tax complexities. But their comments should be helpful to you in understanding the underlying economic characteristics of these important partly-owned businesses. A copy of the full annual report of either company will be mailed to any shareholder of Berkshire upon request to Mr. Robert H. Bird for Blue Chips Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040, or to Mrs. Bette Deckard for Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109.

Textiles

Earnings of $1.3 million in 1978, while much improved from 1977, still represent a low return on the $17 million of capital employed in this business. Textile plant and equipment are on the books for a very small fraction of what it would cost to replace such equipment today. And, despite the age of the equipment, much of it is functionally similar to new equipment being installed by the industry. But despite this "bargain cost" of fixed assets, capital turnover is relatively low reflecting required high investment levels in receivables and inventory compared to sales. Slow capital turnover, coupled with low profit margins on sales, inevitably produces inadequate returns on capital. Obvious approaches to improved profit margins involve differentiation of product, lowered manufacturing costs through more efficient equipment or better utilization of people, redirection toward fabrics enjoying stronger market trends, etc. Our management is diligent in pursuing such objectives. The problem, of course, is that our competitors are just as diligently doing the same thing.

The textile industry illustrates in textbook style how producers of relatively undifferentiated goods in capital intensive businesses must earn inadequate returns except under conditions of tight supply or real shortage. As long as excess productive capacity exists, prices tend to reflect direct operating costs rather than capital employed. Such a supply-excess condition appears likely to prevail most of the time in the textile industry, and our expectations are for profits of relatively modest amounts in relation to capital.

We hope we don't get into too many more businesses with such tough economic characteristics. But, as we have stated before: (1) our textile businesses are very important employers in their communities, (2) management has been straightforward in reporting on problems and energetic in attacking them, (3) labor has been cooperative and understanding in facing our common problems, and (4) the business should average modest cash returns relative to investment. As long as these conditions prevail - and we expect that they will - we intend to continue to support our textile business despite more attractive alternative uses for capital.

Insurance Underwriting

The number one contributor to Berkshire's overall excellent results in 1978 was the segment of National Indemnity Company's insurance operation run by Phil Liesche. On about $90 million of earned premiums, an underwriting profit of approximately $11 million was realized, a truly extraordinary achievement even against the background of excellent industry conditions. Under Phil's leadership, with outstanding assistance by Roland Miller in Underwriting and Bill Lyons in Claims, this segment of National Indemnity (including National Fire and Marine Insurance Company, which operates as a running mate) had one of its best years in a long history of performances which, in aggregate, far outshine those of the industry. Present successes reflect credit not only upon present managers, but equally upon the business talents of Jack Ringwalt, founder of National Indemnity, whose operating philosophy remains etched upon the company.

Home and Automobile Insurance Company had its best year since John Seward stepped in and straightened things out in 1975. Its results are combined in this report with those of Phil Liesche's operation under the insurance category entitled "Specialized Auto and General Liability".

Worker's Compensation was a mixed bag in 1978. In its first year as a subsidiary, Cypress Insurance Company, managed by Milt Thornton, turned in outstanding results. The worker's compensation line can cause large underwriting losses when rapid inflation interacts with changing social concepts, but Milt has a cautious and highly professional staff to cope with these problems. His performance in 1978 has reinforced our very good feelings about this purchase.

Frank DeNardo came with us in the spring of 1978 to straighten out National Indemnity's California Worker's Compensation business which, up to that point, had been a disaster. Frank has the experience and intellect needed to correct the major problems of the Los Angeles office. Our volume in this department now is running only about 25% of what it was eighteen months ago, and early indications are that Frank is making good progress.

George Young's reinsurance department continues to produce very large sums for investment relative to premium volume, and thus gives us reasonably satisfactory overall results. However, underwriting results still are not what they should be and can be. It is very easy to fool yourself regarding underwriting results in reinsurance (particularly in casualty lines involving long delays in settlement), and we believe this situation prevails with many of our competitors. Unfortunately, self-delusion in company reserving almost always leads to inadequate industry rate levels. If major factors in the market don't know their true costs, the competitive "fall-out" hits all - even those with adequate cost knowledge. George is quite willing to reduce volume significantly, if needed, to achieve satisfactory underwriting, and we have a great deal of confidence in the long term soundness of this business under his direction.

The homestate operation was disappointing in 1978. Our unsatisfactory underwriting, even though partially explained by an unusual incidence of Midwestern storms, is particularly worrisome against the backdrop of very favorable industry results in the conventional lines written by our homestate group. We have confidence in John Ringwalt's ability to correct this situation. The bright spot in the group was the performance of Kansas Fire and Casualty in its first full year of business. Under Floyd Taylor, this subsidiary got off to a truly remarkable start. Of course, it takes at least several years to evaluate underwriting results, but the early signs are encouraging and Floyd's operation achieved the best loss ratio among the homestate companies in 1978.

Although some segments were disappointing, overall our insurance operation had an excellent year. But of course we should expect a good year when the industry is flying high, as in 1978. It is a virtual certainty that in 1979 the combined ratio (see definition on page 31) for the industry will move up at least a few points, perhaps enough to throw the industry as a whole into an underwriting loss position. For example, in the auto lines - by far the most important area for the industry and for us - CPI figures indicate rates overall were only 3% higher in January 1979 than a year ago. But the items that make up loss costs - auto repair and medical care costs - were up over 9%. How different than yearend 1976 when rates had advanced over 22% in the preceding twelve months, but costs were up 8%.

Margins will remain steady only if rates rise as fast as costs. This assuredly will not be the case in 1979, and conditions probably will worsen in 1980. Our present thinking is that our underwriting performance relative to the industry will improve somewhat in 1979, but every other insurance management probably views its relative prospects with similar optimism - someone is going to be disappointed. Even if we do improve relative to others, we may well have a higher combined ratio and lower underwriting profits in 1979 than we achieved last year.

We continue to look for ways to expand our insurance operation. But your reaction to this intent should not be unrestrained joy. Some of our expansion efforts - largely initiated by your Chairman - have been lackluster, others have been expensive failures. We entered the business in 1967 through purchase of the segment which Phil Liesche now manages, and it still remains, by a large margin, the best portion of our insurance business. It is not easy to buy a good insurance business, but our experience has been that it is easier to buy one than create one. However, we will continue to try both approaches, since the rewards for success in this field can be exceptional.

Insurance Investments

We confess considerable optimism regarding our insurance equity investments. Of course, our enthusiasm for stocks is not unconditional. Under some circumstances, common stock investments by insurers make very little sense.

We get excited enough to commit a big percentage of insurance company net worth to equities only when we find (1) businesses we can understand, (2) with favorable long-term prospects, (3) operated by honest and competent people, and (4) priced very attractively. We usually can identify a small number of potential investments meeting requirements (1), (2) and (3), but (4) often prevents action. For example, in 1971 our total common stock position at Berkshire's insurance subsidiaries amounted to only $10.7 million at cost, and $11.7 million at market. There were equities of identifiably excellent companies available - but very few at interesting prices. (An irresistible footnote: in 1971, pension fund managers invested a record 122% of net funds available in equities - at full prices they couldn't buy enough of them. In 1974, after the bottom had fallen out, they committed a then record low of 21% to stocks.)

The past few years have been a different story for us. At the end of 1975 our insurance subsidiaries held common equities with a market value exactly equal to cost of $39.3 million. At the end of 1978 this position had been increased to equities (including a convertible preferred) with a cost of $129.1 million and a market value of $216.5 million. During the intervening three years we also had realized pre-tax gains from common equities of approximately $24.7 million. Therefore, our overall unrealized and realized pre-tax gains in equities for the three year period came to approximately $112 million. During this same interval the Dow-Jones Industrial Average declined from 852 to 805. It was a marvelous period for the value-oriented equity buyer.

We continue to find for our insurance portfolios small portions of really outstanding businesses that are available, through the auction pricing mechanism of security markets, at prices dramatically cheaper than the valuations inferior businesses command on negotiated sales.

This program of acquisition of small fractions of businesses (common stocks) at bargain prices, for which little enthusiasm exists, contrasts sharply with general corporate acquisition activity, for which much enthusiasm exists. It seems quite clear to us that either corporations are making very significant mistakes in purchasing entire businesses at prices prevailing in negotiated transactions and takeover bids, or that we eventually are going to make considerable sums of money buying small portions of such businesses at the greatly discounted valuations prevailing in the stock market. (A second footnote: in 1978 pension managers, a group that logically should maintain the longest of investment perspectives, put only 9% of net available funds into equities - breaking the record low figure set in 1974 and tied in 1977.)

We are not concerned with whether the market quickly revalues upward securities that we believe are selling at bargain prices. In fact, we prefer just the opposite since, in most years, we expect to have funds available to be a net buyer of securities. And consistent attractive purchasing is likely to prove to be of more eventual benefit to us than any selling opportunities provided by a short-term run up in stock prices to levels at which we are unwilling to continue buying.

Our policy is to concentrate holdings. We try to avoid buying a little of this or that when we are only lukewarm about the business or its price. When we are convinced as to attractiveness, we believe in buying worthwhile amounts.

Equity holdings of our insurance companies with a market value of over $8 million on December 31, 1978 were as follows:

No. of SharesCompanyCost (000s omitted)Market (000s omitted)
246,450American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.$6,082$8,626
1,294,308Government Employees Insurance Company Common Stock$4,116$9,060
1,986,953Government Employees Insurance Company Convertible Preferred$19,417$28,314
592,650Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc.$4,531$19,039
1,066,934Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation$18,085$18,671
453,800Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc.$7,534$10,267
953,750SAFECO Corporation$23,867$26,467
934,300The Washington Post Company$10,628$43,445
Total$94,260$163,889
All Other Holdings39,50657,040
Total Equities$133,766$220,929

Banking

Under Gene Abegg and Pete Jeffrey, the Illinois National Bank and Trust Company in Rockford continues to establish new records. Last year's earnings amounted to approximately 2.1% of average assets, about three times the level averaged by major banks. In our opinion, this extraordinary level of earnings is being achieved while maintaining significantly less asset risk than prevails at most of the larger banks.

We purchased the Illinois National Bank in March 1969. It was a first-class operation then, just as it had been ever since Gene Abegg opened the doors in 1931. Since 1968, consumer time deposits have quadrupled, net income has tripled and trust department income has more than doubled, while costs have been closely controlled.

Our experience has been that the manager of an already high-cost operation frequently is uncommonly resourceful in finding new ways to add to overhead, while the manager of a tightly-run operation usually continues to find additional methods to curtail costs, even when his costs are already well below those of his competitors. No one has demonstrated this latter ability better than Gene Abegg.

We are required to divest our bank by December 31, 1980. The most likely approach is to spin it off to Berkshire shareholders some time in the second half of 1980.

Retailing

Upon merging with Diversified, we acquired 100% ownership of Associated Retail Stores, Inc., a chain of about 75 popular priced women's apparel stores. Associated was launched in Chicago on March 7, 1931 with one store, $3200, and two extraordinary partners, Ben Rosner and Leo Simon. After Mr. Simon's death, the business was offered to Diversified for cash in 1967. Ben was to continue running the business - and run it, he has.

Associated's business has not grown, and it consistently has faced adverse demographic and retailing trends. But Ben's combination of merchandising, real estate and cost-containment skills has produced an outstanding record of profitability, with returns on capital necessarily employed in the business often in the 20% after-tax area.

Ben is now 75 and, like Gene Abegg, 81, at Illinois National and Louie Vincenti, 73, at Wesco, continues daily to bring an almost passionately proprietary attitude to the business. This group of top managers must appear to an outsider to be an overreaction on our part to an EO bulletin on age discrimination. While unorthodox, these relationships have been exceptionally rewarding, both financially and personally. It is a real pleasure to work with managers who enjoy coming to work each morning and, once there, instinctively and unerringly think like owners. We are associated with some of the very best.

Editor's Annotations

Charlie Munger has been elected Vice Chairman of Berkshire Hathaway.

1978年芒格正式加入Berkshire董事会,担任副董事长。这是'巴菲特-芒格'组合正式形成的标志。在此后的40多年里,芒格一直是巴菲特的'首席顾问'和'反对者'(devil's advocate)。

Our return on equity (ROE) was 19.4% in 1978.

1978年Berkshire的ROE达到19.4%,远超美国工业平均的14.2%。巴菲特始终强调:ROE是衡量管理层资本配置能力的最重要指标。

We prefer a business that is easy to understand and has favorable long-term prospects.

这是巴菲特'能力圈'(circle of competence)概念的最早表述之一。他后来在1984年的《金融时报》文章中正式提出了这个概念,但它的思想根源可以追溯到1970年代的早期信件。

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Letter Interpretation

Analysis & Key Insights

📈Market Context
Market Phase
Bull Market
S&P 500
6.5%
Fed Funds
9.1%
Inflation
7.6%

1978 was a year of strong stock market performance (S&P 500 returned about 6.5%) and continuing inflation concerns. The insurance industry was at peak underwriting profitability but beginning to show signs of cycle deterioration. Interest rates were rising as the Federal Reserve under Paul Volcker was beginning to tighten monetary policy to combat inflation. The concept of 'stagflation' remained central to economic discourse. Berkshire's insurance investments were performing well as Buffett concentrated positions in high-quality franchises.

🔢 Key Numbers

Return on Beginning Equity
19.4%
Just below the 1972 record; Buffett explicitly warned this was unsustainable
See's Pretax Profits
$12.5M
Berkshire's share approximately $7M; continuing the post-acquisition growth trajectory
Insurance Equity Holdings
$220.9M
Market value of insurance subsidiaries' equity holdings vs. $133.8M cost
Illinois National ROA
2.1%
Approximately three times the large bank average and more than double 'excellent' banking performance

Then vs Now

📅 Then

In 1978, concentrated investing was considered dangerously undiversified. The insurance underwriting cycle was peaking. Banking excellence like Illinois National's 2.1% ROA was rare. The concept of 'franchise business' was still being developed. Minority ownership of excellent businesses was not yet recognized as potentially superior to control ownership.

🌐 Now

Concentrated investing is accepted among value investors. Insurance cycles are better understood but still driven by competitive irrationality. Banking ROA above 1% is considered exceptional post-2008. The franchise/moat framework is standard. Minority ownership of quality businesses through stock markets is a core strategy for many investors.

📝Overview

Buffett's 1978 letter built systematically upon the conceptual foundations laid in 1977, deepening the moat framework while introducing important new thinking about insurance investment philosophy and the measurement of economic performance. The letter is notable for its sophisticated discussion of accounting complexity arising from the merger with Diversified Retailing Company, which Buffett used as a teaching opportunity to explain why reported earnings often diverge from economic reality. With characteristic intellectual honesty, Buffett warned shareholders that the extraordinary 19.4% return on beginning equity capital achieved in 1978 would not be sustained, demonstrating his consistent practice of underpromising and overdelivering. The letter contained Buffett's most detailed exposition to date of his concentrated equity investment approach—the practice of building very large positions in a small number of outstanding businesses and then holding them indefinitely. Using See's Candies and GEICO as continuing examples of franchise businesses, and introducing SAFECO as a new example of an excellently managed insurance company that could be purchased at an attractive price through the stock market, Buffett articulated a philosophy of 'passive participation in exceptional management' that would guide Berkshire's investment approach for decades. The letter also addressed the coming deterioration in insurance underwriting cycles, demonstrating Buffett's ability to look ahead and prepare shareholders for inevitable cyclical downturns.

📌 Key Takeaways

  • 1Buffett achieved a 19.4% return on beginning equity capital (just shy of the 1972 record), but explicitly warned this was unsustainable and would decline in 1979.
  • 2The insurance equity investment philosophy was elaborated: concentrate capital in a few outstanding businesses at attractive prices, welcome price declines in stocks you intend to hold long-term, and be content with passive ownership of excellently managed businesses.
  • 3See's Candies continued to demonstrate the franchise model, with pretax profits of $12.5 million on minimal capital investment—a business that pricing power made consistently profitable.
  • 4SAFECO emerged as a new example: one of America's best-run property-casualty insurers, available at a discount to book value through the stock market—proving that minority ownership could be superior to control ownership.
  • 5The insurance underwriting cycle was beginning to turn: Buffett forecast that industry combined ratios would rise and that Berkshire's underwriting profits would decline, demonstrating his willingness to prepare shareholders for cyclical reality.
📖

Accounting Complexity as a Teaching Opportunity

Background

The 1978 letter opened with an unusual and characteristically educational discussion of accounting complexity arising from Berkshire's merger with Diversified Retailing Company. Because Berkshire's ownership of Blue Chip Stamps had increased to approximately 58%, Blue Chip's financial statements had to be fully consolidated into Berkshire's balance sheet and income statement for the first time. This created reporting complexities: businesses that Berkshire owned partially through Blue Chip now appeared as if Berkshire owned them fully, while the minority interest (the 42% of Blue Chip not owned by Berkshire) had to be shown as a liability-like item on the balance sheet. Rather than simply apologizing for the complexity or promising to simplify it, Buffett used the situation as a teaching opportunity. He explained to shareholders why consolidated financial statements—which aggregate diverse businesses with very different economic characteristics—often 'obscure economic reality rather than clarify it.' A single number like 'consolidated earnings per share' might combine the exceptional returns of See's Candies with the poor returns of textiles, creating a meaningless average that obscured rather than informed. This discussion revealed Buffett's broader philosophy about corporate disclosure: reports to owners should help owners understand the business, even if that meant providing more rather than less detail. Throughout the letter, Buffett provided separate financial information and commentary for each major business segment—insurance, textiles, retail, banking, and See's—so that shareholders could evaluate each business on its own merits. The accounting discussion also contained a subtle but important point about the limitations of standardized financial reporting. Accounting rules are necessarily one-size-fits-all, but businesses are not. Buffett was effectively teaching shareholders to look through the accounting to the underlying economic reality—a skill that would serve them well as Berkshire grew larger and more complex. This educational approach to accounting complexity was pure Buffett: transform a boring necessity into an opportunity to teach something important.

💡

The Insurance Equity Investment Philosophy Elaborated

Principle

The heart of the 1978 letter was Buffett's most detailed exposition to date of his philosophy for investing insurance company float in marketable equities. Building on the framework introduced in 1977, Buffett explained why he was willing to concentrate Berkshire's insurance portfolios in a very small number of businesses—a practice that conventional investment wisdom regarded as dangerously undiversified. The philosophy rested on a simple but powerful insight: if you could identify a small number of truly excellent businesses trading at attractive prices, you were better served owning a large percentage of those businesses (even without control) than owning tiny percentages of many mediocre businesses. Buffett wrote: 'We believe that a policy of combining the owner-orientation of a truly excellent business with the price discount available in the stock market can produce quite extraordinary long-term results.' To illustrate, Buffett discussed SAFECO Corporation, one of America's best-run property-casualty insurance companies. SAFECO's insurance operations were superior to Berkshire's own insurance operations in many respects, and certainly better than any insurance business Buffett could have built from scratch or acquired at fair prices. Yet SAFECO stock could be purchased at a significant discount to book value—meaning that Berkshire could acquire a pro-rata share of SAFECO's exceptional insurance business for less than it would cost to build or buy a similar business outright. This insight—that minority ownership of exceptional businesses could be economically superior to control ownership of mediocre businesses—was radical. It challenged the conventional wisdom that 'control' was valuable and that diversification was necessary. Buffett was arguing, in effect, that if you could find a few truly exceptional businesses and buy them at attractive prices, you should concentrate your capital and then step back. The managers of those businesses would create value for you as a passive shareholder just as they would if you owned 100%—and in many cases, they would do it better than you could.

🎯

See's Candies and the Franchise Model

Insight

The 1978 letter provided an update on See's Candies that reinforced the franchise business lessons Buffett had begun articulating in 1977. See's achieved pretax operating profits of approximately $12.5 million in 1978 (Berkshire's share: $7 million), continuing the remarkable trajectory from the $4.2 million in pretax profits that the business was earning at the time of acquisition in 1972. What made the See's performance so extraordinary was that it was achieved with almost no additional capital investment. The business required minimal working capital (customers paid upfront, inventory turned rapidly) and minimal fixed capital investment (no need for expensive plants or equipment expansion). Almost all the profits could be distributed to the parent company for deployment elsewhere—making See's a 'cash cow' in the best sense. Buffett used the See's example to reinforce the moat concept introduced in 1977. See's had what amounted to a local monopoly in California boxed chocolates, with powerful brand loyalty and emotional customer attachments that made the business remarkably resistant to competition. See's could raise prices annually with minimal volume impact—the essence of pricing power and a defining characteristic of a franchise business. The letter also contained a subtle but important insight about the difference between 'growth' and 'value creation.' See's was not a growth business in the conventional sense—the boxed chocolate market was not growing, and See's was not rapidly expanding its store count. But See's was an exceptional value creation business because it could consistently increase prices (and therefore profits) without requiring significant capital reinvestment. Buffett was learning that businesses like See's—which combined high returns on capital with low capital requirements—were far more valuable than rapidly growing businesses that required massive capital reinvestment to maintain their growth.

📌

The Insurance Underwriting Cycle Turns

Key Point

While the 1978 letter celebrated exceptional performance across Berkshire's insurance operations, it also contained a characteristically candid warning: the insurance underwriting cycle was beginning to turn, and the exceptionally favorable conditions of 1976-1978 would not persist. Buffett forecast that 'the combined ratio for the industry will increase by at least several percentage points' and that 'almost certainly the combined ratio and the underwriting profit for our own operations will be less good in 1979 than in 1978.' This forecast was notable for several reasons. First, it demonstrated Buffett's willingness to prepare shareholders for disappointment rather than polishing the outlook. Most CEOs would have emphasized the positive and downplayed emerging headwinds; Buffett did the opposite, explicitly warning that the 19.4% ROE achieved in 1978 would not be repeated in 1979. Second, the forecast revealed Buffett's sophisticated understanding of insurance industry dynamics. The underwriting cycle—the periodic oscillation between hard markets (tight conditions, rising premiums, underwriting profits) and soft markets (loose conditions, falling premiums, underwriting losses)—was well understood by insurance professionals. But Buffett understood something deeper: the cycle was driven by irrational competitive behavior. When conditions were good, insurers competed aggressively for market share by cutting rates, eventually driving the entire industry into underwriting losses. Discipline rarely held. Third, the letter illustrated Buffett's own approach to cycle management. Rather than trying to time the cycle, Buffett focused on maintaining underwriting discipline regardless of what competitors did. Phil Liesche at National Indemnity was explicitly praised for being willing to let business walk away rather than write unprofitable policies—a discipline that was 'rare and correct' and that 'absolutely must be present for the successful operation of a first-class property-casualty insurance company.'

🎯

Banking Excellence: The Illinois National Bank

Insight

The 1978 letter contained a glowing update on the Illinois National Bank & Trust Company, the Rockford, Illinois-based bank that Berkshire had acquired in 1969. Under the leadership of Gene Abegg (founder) and Pete Jeffrey (who had joined as president in 1977), the bank achieved an extraordinary return on assets of approximately 2.1%—about three times the average of large banks and more than double what was considered excellent performance in the banking industry. What made Illinois National's performance so remarkable was that it was achieved while paying the highest rates to depositors and maintaining a conservatively invested, highly liquid asset portfolio. Most banks that achieved high returns on assets did so by taking aggressive risks—lending to questionable borrowers, investing in long-term securities, or operating with thin capital ratios. Illinois National did none of these. It was, in Buffett's description, 'a first-class operation' that combined exceptional profitability with exceptional safety. The discussion of Illinois National also revealed Buffett's thinking about what made certain businesses and certain managers exceptional. Gene Abegg was 80 years old in 1978 and still running the bank with extraordinary energy and skill. Pete Jeffrey, who had joined from Omaha's U.S. National Bank, was being groomed as Abegg's successor. Buffett's description of this transition revealed his philosophy about management succession: identify able people, give them authority, and then step back. He did not need to micromanage; he needed to hire well. The letter also noted that Berkshire would probably be required to divest the bank by the end of 1980 under the Bank Holding Company Act. This regulatory requirement would eventually force the spinoff of the bank to Berkshire shareholders in 1980—a transaction that Buffett approached with characteristic creativity, designing a share exchange that allowed shareholders to maintain their proportional ownership in both entities.

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