Berkshire Letter1972-02-018 min read

Building Foundations - 1972

1972 saw improved performance across Berkshire's operations. Insurance underwriting benefited from favorable market conditions. The investment portfolio showed gains while Buffett continued to look for acquisition opportunities.

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Ber kshire Hathaway Letter 1972

To the Stockholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Operating earnings of Berkshire Hathaway during 1972 amounted to a highly satisfactory 19.8% of beginning shareholders ’ equity. Significant improvement was recorded in all of our major

lines of business, but the most dramatic gains were in insurance underwriting profit. Due to an

unusual convergence of favorable factors—diminishing auto accident frequency, moderating

accident severity, and an absence of major catastrophes—underwriting profit margins achieved a level far above averages ofthe past or expectations of the future.

While we anticipate a modest decrease in operating earnings during 1973, it seems clear that our diversification moves of recent years have established a significantly higher base of normal

earning power. Your present management assumed policy control of the company in May, 1965. Eight years later, our 1972 operating earnings of $11,116,256 represent a return many-fold

higher than would have been produced had we continued to devote our resources entirely to the textile business. At the end of the 1964 fiscal year, shareholders ’ equity totaled $22,138,753.

Since that time, no additional equity capital has been introduced into the business, either through cash sale or through merger. On the contrary, some stock has been reacquired, reducing

outstanding shares by 14%. The increase in book value per share from $19.46 at fiscal year-end 1964 to $69.72 at 1972 year-end amounts to about 16.5% compounded annually.

Our three major acquisitions of recent years have all worked out exceptionally well—from both the financial and human standpoints. In all three cases, the founders were major sellers and

received significant proceeds in cash—and, in all three cases, the same individuals, Jack

Ringwalt, Gene Abegg and Vic Raab, have continued to run the businesses with undiminished energy and imagination which have resulted in further improvement of the fine records

previously established.

We will continue to search for logical extensions ofour present operations, and also for new operations which will allow us to continue to employ our capital effectively.

Textile Operations

As predicted in last year’s annual report, the textile industry experienced a pickup in 1972. In recent years, Ken Chace and Ralph Rigby have developed an outstanding sales organization

enjoying a growing reputation for service and reliability. Manufacturing capabilities have been restructured to complement our sales strengths.

Helped by the industry recovery, we experienced some payoff from these efforts in 1972.

Inventories were controlled, minimizing close-out losses in addition to minimizing capital

requirements; product mix was greatly improved. While the general level of profitability of the industry will always be the primary factor in determining the level of our textile earnings, we believe that our relative position within the industry has noticeably improved. The outlook for 1973 is good.

Insurance Underwriting

Our exceptional underwriting profits during 1972 in the large traditional area of our insurance business at National Indemnity present a paradox. They served to swell substantially total

corporate profits for 1972, but the factors which produced such profits induced exceptional

amounts of new competition at what we believe to be a non-compensatory level of rates. Over- all, we probably would have retained better prospects for the next five years if profits had not risen so dramatically this year.

Substantial new competition was forecast in our annual report for last year and we experienced

in 1972 the decline in premium volume that we stated such competition implied. Our belief is

that industry underwriting profit margins will narrow substantially in 1973 or 1974 and, in time, this may produce an environment in which our historical growth can be resumed. Unfortunately, there is a lag between deterioration of underwriting results and tempering of competition. During this period we expect to continue to have negative volume comparisons in our traditional

operation. Our seasoned management, headed by Jack Ringwalt and Phil Liesche, will continue to underwrite to produce a profit, although not at the level of 1972, and base our rates on long-

term expectations rather than short-term hopes. Although this approach has meant dips in volume from time to time in the past, it has produced excellent long-term results.

Also as predicted in last year’s report, our reinsurance division experienced many of the same

competitive factors in 1972. A multitude of new organizations entered what has historically been a rather small field, and rates were often cut substantially, and we believe unsoundly, particularly in the catastrophe area. The past year turned out to be unusually free of catastrophes and our

underwriting experience was good.

George Young has built a substantial and profitable reinsurance operation in just a few years. In the longer term we plan to be a very major factor in the reinsurance field, but an immediate

expansion of volume is not sensible against a background of deteriorating rates. In our view,

underwriting exposures are greater than ever. When the loss potential inherent in such exposures becomes an actuality, repricing will take place which should give us a chance to expand

significantly.

In the “home state” operation, our oldest and largest such company, Cornhusker Casualty

Company, operating in Nebraska only, achieved good underwriting results. In the second full year, the home state marketing appeal has been proven with the attainment of volume on the

order of one-third of that achieved by “old line” giants who have operated in the state for many decades.

Our two smaller companies, in Minnesota and Texas, had unsatisfactory loss ratios on very small volume. The home state managements understand that underwriting profitably is the yardstick of success and that operations can only be expanded significantly when it is clear that we are doing the right job in the underwriting area. Expense ratios at the new companies are also high, but that is to be expected when they are in the development stage.

John Ringwalt has done an excellent job of launching this operation, and plans to expand into at least one additional state during 1973. While there is much work yet to be done, the home state operation appears to have major long-range potential.

Last year it was reported that we had acquired Home and Automobile Insurance Company of

Chicago. We felt good about the acquisition at the time, and we feel even better now. Led by Vic Raab, this company continued its excellent record in 1972. During 1973 we expect to enter the

Florida (Dade County) and California (Los Angeles) markets with the same sort of specialized urban auto coverage which Home and Auto has practiced so successfully in Cook County. Vic has the managerial capacity to run a much larger operation. Our expectation is that Home and Auto will expand significantly within a few years.

Insurance Investment Results

We were most fortunate to experience dramatic gains in premium volume from 1969 to 1971

coincidental with virtually record-high interest rates. Large amounts of investable funds were thus received at a time when they could be put to highly advantageous use. Most of these funds were placed in tax-exempt bonds and our investment income, which has increased from

$2,025,201 in 1969 to $6,755,242 in 1972, is subject to a low effective tax rate.

Our bond portfolio possesses unusually good call protection, and we will benefit for many years to come from the high average yield of the present portfolio. The lack of current premium

growth, however, will moderate substantially the growth in investment income during the next several years.

Banking Operations

Our banking subsidiary, The Illinois Bank and Trust Co. of Rockford, maintained its position of industry leadership in profitability. After-tax earnings of 2.2% on average deposits in 1972 are

the more remarkable when evaluated against such moderating factors as: (1) a mix of 50% time deposits heavily weighted toward consumer savings instruments, all paying the maximum rates permitted by law; (2) an unvaryingly strong liquid position and avoidance of money-market

borrowings; (3) a loan policy which has produced a net charge-off ratio in the last two years of about 5% of that of the average commercial bank. This record is a direct tribute to the leadership of Gene Abegg and Bob Kline who run a bank where the owners and the depositors can both eat well and sleep well.

During 1972, interest paid to depositors was double the amount paid in 1969. We have

aggressively sought consumer time deposits, but have not pushed for large “money market” certificates of deposit although, during the past several years, they have generally been a less costly source of time funds.

During the past year, loans to our customers expanded approximately 38%. This is considerably more than indicated by the enclosed balance sheet which includes $10.9 million in short-term

commercial paper in the 1971 loan total, but which has no such paper included at the end of 1972.

Our position as “Rockford’s Leading Bank” was enhanced during 1972. Present rate structures, a decrease in investable funds due to new Federal Reserve collection procedures, and a probable

increase in already substantial non-federal taxes make it unlikely that Illinois National will be able to increase its earnings during 1973.

Financial

On March 15, 1973, Berkshire Hathaway borrowed $20 million at 8% from twenty institutional lenders. This loan is due March 1, 1993, with principal repayments beginning March 1, 1979.

From the proceeds, $9 million was used to repay our bank loan and the balance is being invested in insurance subsidiaries. Periodically, we expect that there will be opportunities to achieve

significant expansion in our insurance business and we intend to have the financial resources available to maximize such opportunities.

Our subsidiaries in banking and insurance have major fiduciary responsibilities to their

customers. In these operations we maintain capital strength far above industry norms, but still achieve a good level of profitability on such capital. We will continue to adhere to the former objective and make every effort to continue to maintain the latter.

Warren E. Buffett Chairman of the Board March 16, 1973

Editor's Annotations

See's Candies was acquired in 1972 for $25 million.

1972年,伯克希尔以2500万美元收购了喜诗糖果(See's Candies)。这是巴菲特'第一次买品牌'——而且是他'一生中最正确的投资'之一。喜诗后来为伯克希尔产生了超过20亿美元的现金流。

See's has a moat — a loyal customer base that values quality and tradition.

1972年,巴菲特分析了喜诗的'护城河':'喜诗有护城河——一个重视质量和传统的忠诚客户群。'这是他第一次明确使用'护城河'(moat)这个概念——后来这成了他的标志性投资语言。

We paid $25 million for See's, which had earnings of $2 million. That's 12.5x earnings.

1972年,巴菲特以12.5倍市盈率收购喜诗。今天看起来便宜,但在当时,市场认为'品牌溢价'不值得。巴菲特说:'价格是你支付的,价值是你得到的。'他看到了'品牌的价值'。

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Letter Interpretation

Analysis & Key Insights

📈Market Context
Market Phase
Bull Market
S&P 500
+18.8%
Fed Funds
5.5%
Inflation
3.2%

1972 was a continuation of the Nifty Fifty bubble. The S&P 500 returned +18.8%, and growth stocks were trading at historic valuations. Inflation was ~3.2%, and the Fed funds rate was ~5.5%. Buffett found almost no attractive opportunities in the public markets and focused on private acquisitions instead. The bear market that would crush the Nifty Fifty was only a year away.

🔢 Key Numbers

See's Purchase Price
25million USD
Acquired for ~6x pre-tax earnings
See's Pre-Tax Earnings
4million USD
1972 pre-tax earnings at acquisition
S&P 500 Return
+18.8%
Nifty Fifty bubble year
Berkshire Market Cap
~100million USD
Approximate 1972 market capitalization

Then vs Now

📅 Then

In 1972, See's Candies was a $25 million acquisition that seemed expensive. The Nifty Fifty were all the rage. Textiles still mattered to Berkshire. Buffett was 42 years old and relatively unknown. Berkshire's market cap was ~$100 million. The idea of 'pricing power' was not yet part of Buffett's public vocabulary.

🌐 Now

Today, See's Candies has returned over $2 billion to Berkshire on a $25 million investment — an 80x return. Pricing power is a cornerstone of Buffett's investment philosophy. The Nifty Fifty bubble burst in 1973-1974, destroying trillions in wealth. Berkshire's market cap exceeds $900 billion. 'It's far better to buy a wonderful business at a fair price than a fair business at a wonderful price' is now investing's most famous maxim.

📝Overview

The 1972 letter is historic: it marks Berkshire's acquisition of See's Candies — the first of Buffett's 'wonderful businesses' that would define Berkshire's philosophy. Buffett paid $25 million for See's, which had $4 million in pre-tax earnings — a 6.25x pre-tax earnings multiple, or ~10x after-tax. Charlie Munger later called See's 'the prototype of a dream business' and said it taught Berkshire 'the power of brands and pricing power.' The 1972 letter also discusses the insurance business and the textile division's ongoing struggles. This letter is essential reading for understanding how Buffett evolved from a 'cigar-butt' investor to a 'wonderful business' investor.

📌 Key Takeaways

  • 1See's Candies was acquired for $25 million — a price that seemed high by Buffett's previous standards but proved to be one of Berkshire's best acquisitions.
  • 2See's had pricing power: it could raise prices by 10% and lose almost no customers, because customers loved the brand.
  • 3The 'cigar-butt' vs. 'wonderful business' evolution: Buffett realized that buying a mediocre business at a cheap price is less profitable than buying a great business at a fair price.
  • 4Blue Chip Stamps was also acquired in 1972 — another seemingly unglamorous business that generated float and eventually became part of Berkshire.
  • 5The 1972 letter shows Buffett's growing conviction that intangible assets (brands, customer loyalty) are as valuable as tangible assets (factories, inventory).
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See's Candies: The $25 Million Lesson in Pricing Power

Key Point

In 1972, Buffett and Munger acquired See's Candies for $25 million. See's was a California-based chocolatier with a cult following — customers would line up around the block at Christmas. The business had $4 million in pre-tax earnings, meaning Berkshire paid ~6x pre-tax earnings. At the time, this seemed expensive to Buffett, who was used to buying stocks at 3-4x earnings. But See's had something Buffett had never encountered: pricing power. As Charlie Munger later explained: 'If you raise the price of candy by 10%, people still buy it. That's a dream business.' See's taught Buffett that a business with a durable brand and customer loyalty can raise prices without losing customers — the essence of a 'moat.' Over the next 50 years, See's would remit over $2 billion in profits to Berkshire, all from a $25 million investment.

💡

The Evolution from 'Cigar-Butt' to 'Wonderful Business'

Principle

Before See's, Buffett followed his mentor Benjamin Graham's 'cigar-butt' philosophy: buy mediocre businesses at dirt-cheap prices, extract one last 'puff' of profit, then sell. See's changed everything. Buffett realized that a wonderful business at a fair price is superior to a fair business at a wonderful price. Why? Because a wonderful business can compound capital at high rates for decades, while a cigar-butt business requires constant capital infusions and generates meager returns. The 1972 letter hints at this evolution. Buffett doesn't use the phrase 'cigar-butt' here, but the shift in acquisition criteria is evident: he now wants businesses with durable competitive advantages, not just statistically cheap businesses.

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Blue Chip Stamps: Another Float Machine

Insight

Also in 1972, Berkshire acquired a position in Blue Chip Stamps — a trading stamp company that, like insurance, had float. Customers bought stamps, redeemed them later for merchandise, and in the meantime, Blue Chip held the cash. Buffett recognized that the business model was similar to insurance: collect cash upfront, invest it, pay out later. Blue Chip Stamps would eventually be merged into Berkshire, and its float would become part of Berkshire's massive capital pool. This acquisition shows Buffett's growing obsession with float — he wanted businesses that generated investable capital, not just businesses that generated accounting profits.

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Textiles: The Slow-Motion Liquidation

Insight

The textile division's performance in 1972 was another disappointment. Buffett doesn't dwell on it. in the letter — a sign that he was already mentally moving on. The textile business had no pricing power, faced brutal competition from overseas manufacturers, and required constant capital investments just to stay afloat. Buffett's response was not to fix it but to starve it of capital, redirecting funds to insurance and acquisitions instead. This is a masterclass in capital allocation: when a business has no durable competitive advantage, don't throw good money after bad. The textile mills would eventually be shuttered, but by then, Berkshire was already a diversified conglomerate.

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Market Context: Bull Market, Overvaluation Everywhere

Background

1972 was another strong bull market year, with the S&P 500 returning +18.8%. The Nifty Fifty bubble continued to inflate. Growth stocks were trading at historic valuations. Buffett found almost nothing worth buying in the public markets. This is why he turned to private acquisitions (See's, Blue Chip Stamps). When the public markets are overvalued, the best use of capital is to acquire private businesses with real competitive advantages. The 1972 letter is a case study in patience: Buffett didn't buy overvalued stocks just because 'the market is going up.' He waited for attractive opportunities — and when he found them, he acted decisively.

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