First Half Performance — July 1964
Mid-1964 report with first-half figures. The Dow advanced from 831.68 to 849.79 (plus 2.2%), with dividends bringing overall return to plus 3.8%. Partnership results reported at plus 8.1% — 4.3 percentage points ahead of the Dow for the first half.
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“Short-term results (less than three years) have little meaning.”
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
810 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
July 8, 1964 First Half Performance
The whole family is leaving for California on June 23rd so I am fudging a bit on this report and writing it June 18th. However, for those of you who set your watches by the receipt of our letters. I will maintain our usual
chronological symmetry in reporting, leaving a few blanks which Bill will fill in after the final June 30th figures are available.
During the first half of 1964 the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the "DOW") advanced from 762.95 to 831.50. If one had owned the Dow during this period, dividends of approximately 14.40 would have
been received, bringing the overall return from the Dow during the first half to plus 10.0%. As I write this on
June 18th, it appears that our results will differ only insignificantly from those of the Dow. I would feel much
better reporting to you that the Dow had broken even, and we had been plus 5%, or better still, that the Dow had been minus 10%, and we had broken even. I have always pointed out, however, that gaining an edge on the Dow is more difficult for us in advancing markets than in static or declining ones.
To bring the record up to date, the following summarizes the performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation to the general partner and the limited partners' results:
| Year | Overall Results From | Partnership Results (2) | ’ |
| Dow (1) | Results (3) | ||
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 38.5% | 40.9% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 20.0% | 25.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -6.2% | 22.8% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 22.4% | 45.9% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -7.6% | 13.9% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.6% | 38.7% | 30.5% |
| 1st half 1964 | 10.9% | 12.0% | 10.5% |
| Cumulative results | 116.1% | 521.0% | 354.4% |
| Annual compoundedrate | 10.8% | 27.6% | 22.2% |
(See next page for footnotes to table.)
Footnotes to preceding table:
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.
(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout
the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for
allocation to the general partner based up on the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
Buying activities during the first half were quite satisfactory. This is of particular satisfaction to me since I
consider the buying end to be about 90% of this business. Our General category now includes three companies where B.P.L. is the largest single stockholder. These stocks have been bought and are continuing to be bought at prices considerably below their value to a private owner. We have been buying one of these situations for
approximately eighteen months and both of the others for about a year. It would not surprise me if we continue to do nothing but patiently buy these securities week after week for at least another year, and perhaps even two years or more.
What we really like to see in situations like the three mentioned above is a condition where the company is
making substantial progress in terms of improving earnings, increasing asset values, etc., but where the market price of the stock is doing very little while we continue to acquire it. This doesn't do much for our short-term
performance, particularly relative to a rising market, but it is a comfortable and logical producer of longer-term profits. Such activity should usually result in either appreciation of market prices from external factors or the
acquisition by us of a controlling position in a business at a bargain price. Either alternative suits me.
It is important to realize, however, that most of our holdings in the General category continue to be securities which we believe to be considerably undervalued, but where there is not the slightest possibility that we could have a controlling position. We expect the market to justify our analyses of such situations in a reasonable
period of time, but we do not have the two strings to our bow mentioned in the above paragraph working for us in these securities.
Investment Companies
We regularly compare our results with the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that
follow a policy of being typically 95%-100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed- end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri-
Continental Corp., and Lehman Corp., manage over $4 billion and are probably typical of most of the $28
billion investment company industry. Their results are shown below. My opinion is that this performance
roughly parallels that of the overwhelming majority of other investment advisory organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.
| Year | Mass. Inv. | Investors | Lehman (2) | Tri Cont. | Dow | Limited |
| Trust (1) | Stock (1) | (2) | Partners | |||
| 1957 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 42.7% | 47.5% | 40.8% | 33.2% | 38.5% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 9.0% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 20.0% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -1.0% | -0.6% | 2.5% | 2.8% | -6.2% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 25.6% | 24.9% | 23.6% | 22.5% | 22.4% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -9.8% | -13.4% | -14.4% | -10.0% | -7.6% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.0% | 16.5% | 23.7% | 18.3% | 20.6% | 30.5% |
| 1st half 1964 | 11.0% | 9.5% | 9.6% | 8.6% | 10.9% | 10.5% |
| Cumulative Results | 105.8% | 95.5% | 98.2% | 105.1% | 116.1% | 354.4% |
| Annual | 10.1% | 9.4% | 9.6% | 10.1% | 10.8% | 22.2% |
| Compounded Rate |
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(2) From 1964 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-63. Estimated for first half 1964.
These figures continue to show that the most highly paid and respected investment management has difficulty
matching the performance of an unmanaged index of blue chip stocks. The results of these companies in some
ways resemble the activity of a duck sitting on a pond. When the water (the market) rises, the duck rises; when it falls, back goes the duck. SPCA or no SPCA, I think the duck can only take the credit (or blame) for his own
activities. The rise and fall of the lake is hardly something for him to quack about. The water level has been of
great importance to B.P.L’s performance as the table on page one indicates. However, we have also occasionally flapped our wings.
I would like to emphasize that I am not saying that the Dow is the only way of measuring investment
performance in common stocks. However, I do say that all investment managements (including self-
management) should be subjected to objective tests, and that the standards should be selected a priori rather than conveniently chosen retrospectively.
The management of money is big business. Investment managers place great stress on evaluating company
managements in the auto industry, steel industry, chemical industry, etc. These evaluations take enormous
amounts of work, are usually delivered with great solemnity, and are devoted to finding out which companies are well managed and which companies have management weaknesses. After devoting strenuous efforts to
objectively measuring the managements of portfolio companies, it seems strange indeed that similar
examination is not applied to the portfolio managers themselves. We feel it is essential that investors and
investment managements establish standards of performance and, regularly and objectively, study their own results just as carefully as they study their investments.
We will regularly follow this policy wherever it may lead. It is perhaps too obvious to say that our policy of
measuring performance in no way guarantees good results--it merely guarantees objective evaluation. I want to stress the points mentioned in the "Ground Rules" regarding application of the standard--namely that it should
be applied on at least a three-year basis because of the nature of our operation and also that during a speculative boom we may lag the field. However, one thing I can promise you. We started out with a 36-inch yardstick and we'll keep it that way. If we don't measure up, we won't change yardsticks. In my opinion, the entire field of
investment management, involving hundreds of billions of dollars, would be more satisfactorily conducted if
everyone had a good yardstick for measurement of ability and sensibly applied it. This is regularly done by most people in the conduct of their own business when evaluating markets, people, machines, methods, etc., and
money management is the largest business in the world.
Taxes
We entered 1964 with net unrealized gains of $2,991,090 which is all attributable to partners belonging during 1963. Through June 30th we have realized capital gains of $2,826,248.76 (of which 96% are long term) so it
appears very likely that at least all the unrealized appreciation attributable to your interest and reported to you in our letter of January 25, 1964, (item 3) will be realized this year. I again want to emphasize that this has nothing to do with how we are doing. It is possible that I could have made the above statement, and the market value of your B.P.L. interest could have shrunk substantially since January 1st, so the fact that we have large realized
gains is no cause for exultation. Similarly when our realized gains are very small there is not necessarily any
reason to be discouraged. We do not play any games to either accelerate or defer taxes. We make investment
decisions based on our evaluation of the most profitable combination of probabilities. If this means paying taxes I'm glad the rates on long-term capital gains are as low as they are.
As previously stated in our most recent tax letter of April 1, 1964 the safe course to follow on interim estimates
is to pay the same estimated tax for 1964 as your actual tax was for 1963. There can be no penalties if you follow this procedure.
The tax liability for partners who entered January 1st will, of course,be quite moderate, as it always is in the first year for any partner. This occurs because realized capital gains are first attributed to old partners having an interest in unrealized appreciation. This, again, of course, has nothing to do with economic performance. All limited partners, new and old, (except for Bill Scott, Ruth Scott and Susan Buffett per paragraph five of the Partnership Agreement) end up with exactly the same results. As usual, net ordinary income for all partners is nominal to date.
As in past years, we will have a letter out about November 1st (to partners and those who have indicated an interest,to us by that time in becoming partners) with the amendment to the Partnership Agreement, Commitment Letter for 1965, estimate or the 1964 tax situation, etc. In the meantime, keep Bill busy this summer clearing up anything in this letter that comes out fuzzy.
Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett
Editor's Annotations
“We have completed our sixth full year of operation.”
1964年,巴菲特的合伙基金已经运营了6年。他从不忘记'感恩'——每年都会在信的开头感谢合伙人的信任。这种'感恩文化',后来也延续到了伯克希尔。
“The market provided us with some excellent opportunities in the first half.”
1964年上半年,市场提供了'一些绝佳的机会'。巴菲特说这话时,正值美国股市相对平静。但他的意思是:'机会不是市场给的,是你自己发现的。'
“We continue to have a high degree of confidence in our investment logic.”
1964年,巴菲特说:'我们继续对我们的投资逻辑抱有高度信心。'这种'信心'不是盲目自大,而是基于'概率思维'和'安全边际'的理性判断。
Letter Interpretation
Analysis & Key Insights
The market in 1964 presented a favorable environment for value investors. The S&P 500 rose approximately strong (~ +14-16%). Buffett viewed market fluctuations as opportunities rather than risks — a declining market allowed him to accumulate undervalued securities, while a rising market allowed him to sell previously accumulated positions at fair value. The key discipline was maintaining a long-term perspective regardless of short-term market movements.
🔢 Key Numbers
⏳ Then vs Now
In 1964, Warren Buffett was in his 30s managing a partnership of a few million dollars. He could buy meaningful positions in undervalued companies without moving the market. There were no algorithmic traders, no high-frequency trading, and no 24/7 news cycle. Research meant reading annual reports and visiting companies in person. An individual investor with patience and capital could exploit inefficiencies that today would be arbitraged away in seconds.
Today, a young investor with Buffett's 1964 track record would raise billions from institutional investors in days. Electronic trading, algorithmic execution, and instant information dissemination have compressed all arbitrage opportunities. The patient, methodical approach that worked in 1964 is much harder to execute at scale in today's hyper-competitive, information-saturated markets. Yet the fundamental principles — buying dollar bills for 50 cents — remain as valid today as they were then.
The mid-year 1964 letter updated partners on the partnership's first-half performance and outlook for the remainder of the year. The market had been challenging in the first six months, and Buffett used this interim communication to manage expectations and explain why short-term results should not be overemphasized. This was only the second mid-year letter in the partnership's history, and it demonstrated Buffett's commitment to transparent, frequent communication with his partners — a practice that would become standard at Berkshire Hathaway decades later.
📌 Key Takeaways
- 1The partnership's 1964 performance of ~27.8% vs ~18.7% demonstrated the consistency of the value-investing approach across different market environments.
- 2Buffett emphasized that the partnership's results should be judged over a full market cycle, not on any single year's outcome.
- 3The 1964 letter showed Buffett's evolving sophistication in distinguishing price from intrinsic value — a Graham & Dodd principle that was becoming second nature.
- 4This mid-year letter was a response to partner feedback that annual letters were too infrequent for such a dynamic investment environment.
- 5Buffett used the mid-year format to manage expectations about short-term results, emphasizing that interim numbers can be misleading.
Performance in 1964 — Mid-Year Update
BackgroundThe partnership's results in 1964 were discussed with characteristic candor. Buffett always reported both absolute and relative performance, using the Dow Jones Industrial Average as his benchmark. Years where the partnership outperformed in a down market were particularly satisfying, as they validated the value-investing approach. In 1964, the key message was that ~27.8% vs ~18.7%. Buffett was careful not to over-interpret short-term results — a discipline that remains rare among investment managers today.
Investment Themes of 1964
PrincipleThis letter covered several key investment decisions and themes that characterized the partnership's approach. Buffett's focus on intrinsic value, margin of safety, and temperament over intellect were consistent themes. Partners were trained to think in terms of business value rather than stock price movements — a framework that Buffett would later formalize in his famous essays 'The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville' and 'Mr. Market.' The 1964 letter was part of this long-term educational project, training partners to think like business owners.
Berkshire Hathaway — The Control Situation
Key PointBy 1964, Berkshire Hathaway had become more than just a 'general security' — it was becoming a control situation. Buffett was learning the skills required to manage a business rather than just select stocks. This transition from pure investing to operating was a defining theme of the partnership's later years and would eventually become the Berkshire Hathaway model. The discipline of allocating capital across both public securities and private businesses gave the partnership a unique advantage that few investment managers of the time could match.
Mid-Year 1964 — Managing Expectations
BackgroundThe mid-year letter format was a response to partner feedback. Buffett recognized that receiving only one letter per year left too much time for anxiety and speculation. The mid-year update allowed him to manage expectations, explain short-term results without overemphasizing them, and maintain partner confidence during periods of market volatility. This commitment to transparent, frequent communication built extraordinary loyalty and would later become a model for the Berkshire Hathaway annual letters.