Commitment Letter for 1966
November commitment letter to partners outlining 1966 partnership terms. Introduces Ground Rule 7 reflecting a moderate shift in Buffett's attitude over time. Describes valuation methodology for Berkshire Hathaway controlling interest — halfway between net current asset value and book value, effectively valuing current assets at 100 cents on the dollar and fixed assets at 50 cents.
Key Quotes
“Ground Rule 7 represents a decidedly unconventional (but logical in my opinion) approach.”
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
810 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
November 1, 1965 To My Partners for 1966:
Enclosed are:
(1) Two copies or the commitment letter for 1966, one to be kept by you and one returned to us. You may amend the commitment letter right up to midnight, December 31st. So get it back to us early, and if it
needs to be changed, just let us know by letter or phone. Commitment letters become final on December 31st. Every year I get a number or calls in the first week in January expressing a desire to add to the
January 1st capital. THIS CAN'T BE DONE.
(2) A copy of our ever-popular "The Ground Rules." It is essential that we see eye-to-eye on the matters
covered therein. If you have different views - fine, yours may be better - but you shouldn't be in the
partnership. Please particularly note Ground Rule 7. This has been added this year reflecting a moderate shift in my attitude over a period of time. It represents a decidedly unconventional (but logical in my
opinion when applied to our operation) approach and is therefore specifically called to your attention.
Any withdrawals will be paid January 5th. You may withdraw any amount you desire from $100 up to your
entire equity. Similarly, additions can be for any amount and should reach us by January 10th. In the event you are disposing of anything, this will give you a chance to have the transaction in 1966 if that appears to be
advantageous for tax reasons. If additions reach us in November, they take on the status of advance payments and draw 6% interest until yearend. This is not true of additions reaching us in December.
The partnership owns a controlling interest in Berkshire Hathaway Inc., a publicly-traded security. As
mentioned in my midyear letter, asset values and earning power are the dominant factors affecting the
valuation of a controlling interest in a business. Market price, which governs valuation of minority interest
positions, is of little or no importance in valuing a controlling interest. We will value our position in Berkshire Hathaway at yearend at a price halfway between net current asset value and book value. Because of the nature of our receivables and inventory this, in effect, amounts to valuation of our current assets at 100 cents on the dollar and our fixed assets at 50 cents on the dollar. Such a value in my opinion is fair to both adding and
withdrawing partners. It may be either of lower than market value at the time.
As I write this, we are orbiting in quite satisfactory fashion. Our margin over the Dow is well above average, and even those Neanderthal partners who utilize such crude yardsticks as net profit would find performance satisfactory. This is all, of course, subject to substantial change by yearend.
If anything needs clarification, call or write John Harding who is in charge of "de-confusing" partners. The tax situation is about as reported in the August letter, but if you would like John to make the calculation for you, he will be glad to do it.
Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett
Editor's Annotations
“This special letter discusses the acquisition of Berkshire Hathaway.”
1965年,巴菲特写了一封'特别信',讨论收购伯克希尔·哈撒韦的事宜。这是他一生中'最错的投资'(他后来承认),但也是'最重要的学习经历'。
“Berkshire Hathaway is a textile business with competent management.”
1965年,巴菲特描述伯克希尔:'这是一家有能干管理层的纺织企业。'但他后来发现:'能干的管理层 + 衰退的行业 = 仍然衰退。'这个教训,他用了20年才完全吸取。
“We intend to operate Berkshire Hathaway as a separate business.”
1965年,巴菲特说:'我们打算将伯克希尔·哈撒韦作为一家独立企业运营。'这种'不干涉'的哲学,后来成为伯克希尔收购文化的核心:'我们买公司,不是买部门。'
Letter Interpretation
Analysis & Key Insights
The market in 1965 presented a favorable environment for value investors. The S&P 500 rose approximately strong (~ +12-14%). Buffett viewed market fluctuations as opportunities rather than risks — a declining market allowed him to accumulate undervalued securities, while a rising market allowed him to sell previously accumulated positions at fair value. The key discipline was maintaining a long-term perspective regardless of short-term market movements.
🔢 Key Numbers
⏳ Then vs Now
In 1965, Warren Buffett was in his 30s managing a partnership of a few million dollars. He could buy meaningful positions in undervalued companies without moving the market. There were no algorithmic traders, no high-frequency trading, and no 24/7 news cycle. Research meant reading annual reports and visiting companies in person. An individual investor with patience and capital could exploit inefficiencies that today would be arbitraged away in seconds.
Today, a young investor with Buffett's 1965 track record would raise billions from institutional investors in days. Electronic trading, algorithmic execution, and instant information dissemination have compressed all arbitrage opportunities. The patient, methodical approach that worked in 1965 is much harder to execute at scale in today's hyper-competitive, information-saturated markets. Yet the fundamental principles — buying dollar bills for 50 cents — remain as valid today as they were then.
This special letter from 1965 addressed specific situations that required partner attention outside the normal semi-annual schedule. Buffett used special letters sparingly and only when a situation warranted immediate explanation. The 1965 special letter demonstrated his willingness to communicate directly and transparently with partners about important developments, rather than waiting for the next scheduled letter. This approach built extraordinary trust and loyalty among the limited partners.
📌 Key Takeaways
- 1The partnership's 1965 performance of strong, continued outperformance demonstrated the consistency of the value-investing approach across different market environments.
- 2Buffett emphasized that the partnership's results should be judged over a full market cycle, not on any single year's outcome.
- 3The 1965 letter showed Buffett's evolving sophistication in distinguishing price from intrinsic value — a Graham & Dodd principle that was becoming second nature.
- 4Special letters were used only for time-sensitive situations requiring partner attention, demonstrating disciplined communication.
- 5Buffett's willingness to concentrate positions when he had high conviction was evident in the 1965 special situation.
Performance in 1965
InsightThe partnership's results in 1965 were discussed with characteristic candor. Buffett always reported both absolute and relative performance, using the Dow Jones Industrial Average as his benchmark. Years where the partnership outperformed in a down market were particularly satisfying, as they validated the value-investing approach. In 1965, the key message was that strong, continued outperformance. Buffett was careful not to over-interpret short-term results — a discipline that remains rare among investment managers today.
Investment Themes of 1965
PrincipleThis letter covered several key investment decisions and themes that characterized the partnership's approach. Buffett's focus on intrinsic value, margin of safety, and temperament over intellect were consistent themes. Partners were trained to think in terms of business value rather than stock price movements — a framework that Buffett would later formalize in his famous essays 'The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville' and 'Mr. Market.' The 1965 letter was part of this long-term educational project, training partners to think like business owners.
American Express — The Franchise Insight
Key PointThe American Express 'Salad Oil' scandal of 1963 was a defining moment in Buffett's investment evolution. While most investors panicked and sold, Buffett analyzed the underlying business — the Travelers Cheque division, the credit card business — and concluded that the franchise was intact. This was one of the partnership's most profitable investments and marked the beginning of Buffett's shift from 'cigar butt' investing toward 'franchise' investing. The insight was profound: a business with a durable competitive advantage (a moat) could be worth far more than a statistically cheap business with no competitive protection.