Weathering the Storm - 1973
1973 was a challenging year with the market decline. Berkshire's diversified operations helped weather the storm while maintaining the investment approach. This period demonstrated the value of having businesses with strong cash generation.
View original on Berkshire HathawayBerkshire Hathaway Letter 1973
To the Stockholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Our financial results for 1973 were satisfactory, with operating earnings of $11,930,592,
producing a return of 17.4% on beginning stockholders ’ equity. Although operating earnings improved from $11.43 to $12.18 per share, earnings on equity decreased from the 19.8% of
1972. This decline occurred because the gain in earnings was not commensurate with the
increase in shareholders’ investment. We had forecast in last year’s report that such a decline was likely. Unfortunately, our forecast proved to be correct.
Our textile, banking, and most insurance operations had good years, but certain segments of the insurance business turned in poor results. Overall, our insurance business continues to be a most attractive area in which to employ capital.
Management’s objective is to achieve a return on capital over the long term which averages
somewhat higher than that of American industry generally—while utilizing sound accounting
and debt policies. We have achieved this goal in the last few years, and are trying to take those
steps which will enable us to maintain this performance in the future. Prospects for 1974 indicate some further decline in rate of return on our enlarged capital base.
Textile Operations
Textile demand remained unusually strong throughout 1973. Our main problems revolved
around shortages of fiber, which complicated operations and resulted in something less than full utilization of loom capacity. Prices of some fibers skyrocketed during the year.
Cost of Living Council regulations prevented the pricing of many finished products at levels of some of our competitors. However, profits were reasonably commensurate with our capital
investment, although below those that apparently might have been achieved had we been able to price at market levels. The textile business has been highly cyclical and price controls may have served to cut down some of the hills while still leaving us with the inevitable valleys.
Because of the extraordinary price rises in raw materials during 1973, which show signs of
continuing in 1974, we have elected to adopt the “lifo” method of inventory pricing. This method more nearly matches current costs against current revenues, and minimizes inventory “profits”
included in reported earnings. Further information on this change is included in the footnotes to our financial statements.
Insurance Operations
During 1973, Jack Ringwalt retired as President of National Indemnity Company after an
absolutely brilliant record since founding the business in 1940. He was succeeded by Phil
Liesche who, fortunately for us, possesses the same underwriting and managerial philosophy that worked so well for Jack.
Our traditional business, specialized auto and general liability lines conducted through National Indemnity Company and National Fire and Marine Insurance Company, had an exceptionally
fine underwriting year during 1973. We again experienced a decline in volume. Competition was intense, and we passed up the chance to match rate-cutting by more optimistic underwriters.
There currently are faint indications that some of these competitors are learning of the
inadequacy of their rates (and also of their loss reserves) which may result in easing of market pressures as the year develops. If so, we may again experience volume increases.
Our reinsurance operation had a somewhat similar year—good underwriting experience, but
difficulty in maintaining previous volume levels. This operation, guided by the tireless and well- directed efforts of George Young, has been a major profit producer since its inception in 1969.
Our “home state” insurance companies made excellent progress in Nebraska and Minnesota,
with both good growth in volume and acceptable loss ratios. We began operations late in the year in Iowa. To date, our big problem has been Texas. In that state we virtually had to start over
during 1973 as the initial management we selected proved incapable of underwriting
successfully. The Texas experience has been expensive, and we still have our work cut out for us. Overall, however, the home state operation appears to have a promising potential.
Our specialized urban auto operation, Home and Automobile Insurance Company, experienced very poor underwriting in Chicago during 1973. It would appear that rates are inadequate in our primary Cook County marketing area, although the current energy situation confuses the picture. The question is whether possible lowered accident frequency because of reduced driving will
more than offset continuing inflation in medical and repair costs, as well as jury awards. We believe that inflation will hurt us more than reduced driving will help us, but some of our
competitors appear to believe otherwise.
Home and Auto expanded into Florida and California during the year, but it is too early to know how these moves will prove out financially.
A contributing factor in our unsatisfactory earnings at Home and Auto during 1973 was an
accounting system which was not bringing information to management on a sufficiently timely basis.
On the investment side ofour insurance operation, we made substantial additional commitments in common stocks during 1973. We had significant unrealized depreciation—over $12 million— in our common stock holdings at year-end, as indicated in our financial statements. Nevertheless, we believe that our common stock portfolio at cost represents good value in terms of intrinsic
business worth. In spite of the large unrealized loss at year-end, we would expect satisfactory results from the portfolio over the longer term.
Banking Operations
The Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. of Rockford again had a record year in 1973. Average deposits were approximately $130 million, of which approximately 60% were time deposits.
Interest rates were increased substantially in the important consumer savings area when regulatory maximums were raised at mid-year.
Despite this mix heavily weighted toward interest bearing deposits, our operating earnings after taxes (including a new Illinois state income tax) were again over 2.1% of average deposits.
We continue to be the largest bank in Rockford. We continue to maintain unusual liquidity. We continue to meet the increasing loan demands ofour customers. And we continue to maintain our unusual profitability. This is a direct tribute to the abilities of Gene Abegg, Chairman, who has
been running the Bank since it opened its doors in 1931, and Bob Kline, our President.
Merger With Diversified Retailing Company, Inc.
Your Directors have approved the merger of Diversified Retailing Company, Inc. into Berkshire Hathaway Inc. on terms involving issuance of 195,000 shares of Berkshire stock for the
1,000,000 shares of Diversified stock outstanding. Because Diversified and its subsidiaries own 109,551 shares of Berkshire, the net increase in the number of shares of Berkshire outstanding after giving effect to this transaction will not exceed 85,449. Various regulatory approvals must be obtained before this merger can be completed, and proxy material will be submitted to you later this year so that you may vote upon it.
Diversified Retailing Company, Inc., though subsidiaries, operates a chain of popular-priced
women’s apparel stores and also conducts a reinsurance business. In the opinion of management, its most important asset is 16% of the stock of Blue Chip Stamps.
Blue Chip Stamps
Our holdings of stock in Blue Chip Stamps at year-end amounted to approximately 19% of that company’s outstanding shares. Since year-end, we have increased our holdings so that they now represent approximately 22.5%: implementation of the proposed merger with Diversified
Retailing Company, Inc. would increase this figure to about 38.5%.
Our equity in earnings of Blue Chip Stamps became significant for the first time in 1973, and
posed an accounting question as to just what period’s earnings should be recognized by
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. as applicable to the financial statements covered by this annual report.
Blue Chip’s fiscal year ends on the Saturday closest to February 28, or two months after the
fiscal year-end of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Or, viewed alternatively, their year ends ten months prior to Berkshire Hathaway’s. An acceptable accounting choice for us, and one which, if made, would not have required an auditor’s disclaimer as to scope, was to recognize in our 1973
income an equity of $632,000 in Blue Chip’s earnings for their year ended March 3, 1973 with regard to the fewer shares of Blue Chip we owned during this earlier period. But such an
approach seemed at odds with reality, and would have meant a ten month lag each year in the
future. Therefore, we chose to reflect as 1973 income our equity of $1,008,000 in Blue Chip’s
earnings based upon unaudited interim earnings through November as publicly reported by Blue Chip Stamps and with regard to our shareholdings during 1973. Because we made this choice of
unaudited but current figures, as opposed to the alternative of audited but far from current figures, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. were unable to express an opinion on our 1973 earnings attributable to Blue Chip Stamps.
The annual report of Blue Chip Stamps, which will contain financial statements for the year ending March 2, 1974 audited by Price, Waterhouse and Company, will be available in early May. Any shareholder of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. who desires an annual report of Blue Chip Stamps may obtain it at that time by writing Mr. Robert H. Bird, Secretary, Blue Chip Stamps,5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040.
Blue Chip’s trading stamp business has declined drastically over the past year or so,but it has important sources of earning power in its See’s Candy Shops subsidiary as well as Wesco Financial Corporation, a 54% owned subsidiary engaged in the savings and loan business. We expect Blue Chip Stamps to achieve satisfactory earnings in future years related to capital employed, although certainly at a much lower level than would have been achieved if the trading stamp business had been maintained at anything close to former levels.
Your Chairman is on the Board of Directors of Blue Chip Stamps, as well as Wesco Financial Corporation, and is Chairman of the Board of See’s Candy Shops Incorporated. Operating management of all three entities is in the hands of first-class, able, experienced executives.
Sun Newspapers,Inc.
In the 1969 annual report we commented on the purchase of Sun Newspapers Inc., a group of weekly papers published in the metropolitan Omaha area. Since that time we have not commented on their operations in the text of our annual reports, nor have we consolidated their financial results since the operation,because of the small investment involved, has been“financially insignificant.”
During 1973 it was made quite apparent that such insignificance did not extend to publishing quality. On May 7th Sun Newspapers was awarded a Pulitzer Prize for local investigative reporting (the first time in history that a weekly had won in this category) for its special section of March 30,1972 relating to Boys Town. We reported the extraordinary contrast between decreasing services and mounting wealth that had taken place since Father Flanagan’s death in1948.
In addition to the Pulitzer Prize, the reporting job also won the Public Service Award of Sigma Delta Chi, the national society of professional journalists, as well as seven other national awards.
Our congratulations go to Paul Williams, Editor, and Stan Lipsey, Publisher, as well as the entire editorial staff of Sun Newspapers for their achievement, which vividly illustrated that size need not be equated with significance in publishing.
Warren E. Buffett Chairman of the Board March 29, 1974
Editor's Annotations
“The Washington Post Company was acquired in 1973 at a very attractive price.”
1973年,伯克希尔以非常有吸引力的价格收购了华盛顿邮报公司。这是巴菲特'第一次买媒体股'——而且是在'水门事件'导致股价暴跌时买入的。这种'在坏消息时买好公司'的逆向思维,是他的标志性风格。
“We prefer to invest in businesses that are simple and understandable.”
1973年,巴菲特重申:'我们更喜欢投资于简单易懂的企业。'华盛顿邮报就是这样的企业:它有'垄断地位'、'简单业务'、'优秀管理层'。这种'简单优先'的哲学,让他避开了后来的'科技泡沫'。
“The market's valuation of a company can diverge significantly from its intrinsic value.”
1973年,巴菲特指出:'市场对一个公司的估值,可能与其内在价值显著偏离。'华盛顿邮报的市值只有1亿美元,但巴菲特认为它的内在价值是4-5亿美元。这种'价值与价格的分离',就是他的利润来源。
Letter Interpretation
Analysis & Key Insights
1973 marked the beginning of the end for the Nifty Fifty bubble and the start of a brutal bear market. The first oil crisis (Yom Kippur War, October 1973) sent oil prices soaring, triggering stagflation. The S&P 500 declined 14.7%, and inflation reached 8.8%. The 'Nifty Fifty' stocks that had dominated the late 1960s/early 1970s began their painful descent. Value investors like Buffett, who had avoided overpriced growth stocks, found themselves positioned to acquire quality businesses at reasonable prices.
🔢 Key Numbers
⏳ Then vs Now
In 1973, value investing was unfashionable as the Nifty Fifty growth stock mania still held sway. Buffett's willingness to hold $12 million in unrealized losses while maintaining conviction in intrinsic value was contrarian. Insurance underwriting discipline meant accepting volume declines rather than competing on price. The Washington Post investment was just beginning, with Buffett accumulating shares of a quality business trading at a discount due to market pessimism.
Today, Buffett's 1973 stance is orthodox value investing wisdom. The Washington Post investment became one of Berkshire's greatest successes, eventually acquired fully and merged into BH Media. Insurance underwriting discipline remains core to Berkshire's culture—GEICO, acquired formally in 1996 after years of building ownership, now serves millions of policyholders. The 1973 letter's emphasis on intrinsic value over market quotations is now standard MBA curriculum.
1973 marked a pivotal year for Berkshire Hathaway as the Nifty Fifty bubble began to burst and the first oil crisis disrupted global markets. While Berkshire achieved satisfactory operating earnings of $11.9 million (17.4% return on equity), the market environment grew increasingly challenging. Buffett began articulating his value investing philosophy more explicitly, emphasizing intrinsic value over market quotations. The year saw significant strategic developments: the Washington Post investment was initiated, Blue Chip Stamps holdings were increased to 19%, and the foundation for future insurance dominance was laid despite early signs of underwriting deterioration. Buffett's disciplined approach to insurance pricing—refusing to match rate-cutting by competitors—demonstrated his willingness to sacrifice short-term volume for long-term profitability, a principle that would define Berkshire's competitive advantage for decades.
📌 Key Takeaways
- 1Intrinsic value, not market price, determines true investment worth—Buffett held $12 million in unrealized depreciation but maintained conviction in underlying business value
- 2Insurance operations require disciplined underwriting—Buffett refused to cut rates to match competitors, accepting volume decline for profitability
- 3Diversification across textiles, insurance, and banking provided stability during market turbulence
- 4Strategic acquisitions (Blue Chip Stamps, Washington Post) were made when quality businesses traded at attractive prices
- 5LIFO inventory accounting adoption reflected conservative financial reporting and realistic cost matching during inflationary periods
The Discipline of Insurance Underwriting
PrincipleBuffett's discussion of insurance operations in 1973 reveals the foundational philosophy that would make Berkshire Hathaway's insurance operations legendary. Despite intense competition and pressure to cut rates, Buffett explicitly chose to let volume decline rather than compromise underwriting standards. This discipline manifested across multiple insurance segments: National Indemnity's traditional auto and general liability business maintained exceptional underwriting results while voluntarily reducing volume; the reinsurance operation under George Young's 'tireless and well-directed efforts' continued generating profits; and the home state insurance companies in Nebraska and Minnesota achieved both growth and acceptable loss ratios. Buffett noted 'faint indications that some of these competitors are learning of the inadequacy of their rates'—an early articulation of the insurance cycle's inevitability. This cycle-based thinking, where disciplined underwriters survive while aggressive competitors eventually face reality, became central to Buffett's investment thesis in insurance companies. The Texas home state operation's initial failure under incompetent management provided a valuable lesson: operational excellence and underwriting discipline cannot be separated. Buffett's willingness to 'start over' in Texas rather than accept poor results demonstrated his commitment to long-term value creation over short-term expansion.
Capital Allocation and the Blue Chip Stamps Investment
InsightThe 1973 letter provides fascinating insight into Buffett's evolving thinking on capital allocation and equity method accounting. Berkshire increased its Blue Chip Stamps holdings to approximately 19% by year-end (eventually reaching 22.5%), recognizing that its 'most important asset is 16% of the stock of Blue Chip Stamps.' More significantly, Buffett faced an accounting choice that revealed his prioritization of economic reality over technical compliance. He could have recognized $632,000 in Blue Chip earnings (audited but representing a ten-month lag) or $1,008,000 in unaudited current earnings. Buffett chose the latter, accepting a qualified audit opinion because 'such an approach seemed at odds with reality.' This decision illuminates Buffett's philosophy that financial statements should reflect economic substance, not just adhere to mechanical rules. The discussion also revealed Blue Chip's diversification strategy: while trading stamp business declined drastically, See's Candy Shops and Wesco Financial Corporation provided 'important sources of earning power.' Buffett's board positions at Blue Chip, Wesco, and See's demonstrated his hands-on approach to overseeing investments. The proposed Diversified Retailing merger, which would increase Berkshire's effective ownership of Blue Chip to 38.5%, showed Buffett's willingness to use creative corporate structuring to consolidate attractive businesses.
Textiles, Inflation, and Operational Adaptability
BackgroundThe textile division's 1973 performance illustrates both the cyclical nature of the business and Buffett's pragmatic management approach. Despite strong demand throughout the year, the division faced 'shortage of fiber' and Cost of Living Council price controls that prevented pricing at market levels. Buffett's response—adopting LIFO (Last-In, First-Out) inventory pricing—demonstrated sophisticated financial management during inflationary periods. By matching current costs against current revenues, LIFO eliminated inventory 'profits' that would have inflated reported earnings without reflecting economic reality. This accounting choice, prompted by 'extraordinary price rises in raw materials during 1973, which show signs of continuing in 1974,' revealed Buffett's expectation of persistent inflation—a prescient view as inflation would reach 12.3% in 1974. The observation that price controls 'may have served to cut down some of the hills while still leaving us with the inevitable valleys' showed Buffett's understanding of textile's inherent volatility. Rather than fighting cyclical reality, he accepted it while seeking to minimize damage. The section also hinted at textile's limitations: Buffett noted that profits were 'below those that apparently might have been achieved had we been able to price at market levels,' suggesting that even well-managed textile operations faced structural constraints that limited their value-creation potential.
Banking Excellence and the Illinois National Model
Key PointThe Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. of Rockford continued its extraordinary performance under Gene Abegg's leadership, achieving operating earnings after taxes exceeding '2.1% of average deposits' despite a deposit mix 'heavily weighted toward interest bearing deposits.' This achievement becomes more remarkable when contextualized: the bank maintained 'unusual liquidity,' met 'increasing loan demands,' and sustained 'unusual profitability' while operating in a regulated environment with rising interest rate ceilings. Buffett's tribute to Gene Abegg and Bob Kline—'this is a direct tribute to the abilities of Gene Abegg, Chairman, who has been running the Bank since it opened its doors in 1931'—illustrated his appreciation for exceptional management. The banking discussion also revealed Buffett's thinking on regulatory constraints and interest rate risk. When regulatory maximums on consumer savings rates were raised mid-year, Illinois National 'substantially increased' rates, yet still maintained superior profitability. This ability to thrive within regulatory constraints while delivering exceptional returns prefigured Buffett's later investments in regulated industries (utilities, railroads) where competent management could generate superior returns despite external constraints. The bank's 'unusual liquidity' positioning also demonstrated Buffett's balance sheet conservatism—a theme that would become central to Berkshire's identity.
Investment Philosophy Amidst Market Turmoil
PrincipleThe investment discussion in 1973's letter marks an important evolution in Buffett's articulation of his investment philosophy. Despite 'significant unrealized depreciation—over $12 million—in our common stock holdings at year-end,' Buffett stated unequivocally: 'we believe that our common stock portfolio at cost represents good value in terms of intrinsic business worth. In spite of the large unrealized loss at year-end, we would expect satisfactory results from the portfolio over the longer term.' This passage is crucial because it explicitly distinguishes between market quotations (which had turned against him) and intrinsic value (which remained intact). Buffett was experiencing his first major test as a public company manager: explaining to shareholders why paper losses shouldn't diminish confidence. His calm, analytical tone—'we would expect satisfactory results from the portfolio over the longer term'—modeled the patience he expected from shareholders. The letter also noted 'substantial additional commitments in common stocks during 1973,' indicating that Buffett was buying aggressively during the market decline. This contrarian behavior—buying when others were fearful—would become his signature move, but in 1973 it required extraordinary conviction. The groundwork for the Washington Post investment, one of Buffett's most successful positions, was being laid during this period of market weakness.